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A random strategy for experts The simplest and most famous of these situations occur in the last turn, when only two players are involved. A player has a manifest Draw. In the simplest version, the last cards face down. Like most of you know, there is a division of mathematics, game theory, in various situations Poker can be applied. The simplest and most famous of these situations occur in the last turn, when only two players are involved. A player has a manifest Draw. The other has a ready hand, but will be back when the Draw tribunal. In the simplest version, the last cards face down. In this situation there is complicated and in the spieltheoretisch almost always correct strategy is to random, carefully calculated between two or more alternatives. The basic idea is that we should at frequencies that are not exploited, in a random manner bluff or call Bluffs. This, however, there is a problem. While others from taking you to exploit, this technique allows you not to exploit your opponents. The game theory is that you in a certain number of cases randomly bluff and possible Bluffs call. But what if you know your opponent foldet rarely a good hand? Or if he very rarely blufft? Then cost yourself money if you try to bluff, or if it in the correct frequency spieltheoretisch call. For this reason, apply the most good players rarely game techniques, except perhaps against other experts or people whose interests they have not yet been deciphered. Let me cite hypothetical poker hand, the basic idea of this article to illustrate. It was a pot limit Lowball hand, in which your Draw with 20 percent probability the final hand of your opponent outdated. Let's say it was $ 100 in the pot. So if you are at this point allin would be your expectation figures value of $ 20 Because you but both $ 100 for beds and Callen, your expected value probably greater. If he argwohnischen example to the opponents, your Bets in Potgro?e always call will increase your expectation value to $ 40 if you never bluff. Foldet your opponent but usually, you should with all failed Draws beds. Let's say he foldet to 80%. In 100 cases, would you $ 200 four times and 80 times $ 100 to win 16 times and lose $ 100. These are $ 7,200, or an average expected value of $ 72nd Against those who foldet too much, you win so much more than against those who too often calls  if you have the courage to exploit its weakness. Of course you can call the affections of most players not be accurately predicted. And when you're wrong, it cost a lot of money. If it for a caller, but he is not, then drops your expectation value to $ 20 If you think he can easily geblufft, but it is not true, then your expected value even negative. (If you ever, and he always calls, then your expectation of value  $ 40) For this reason game player types remain in doubt in their approach. Here are two more points. For example, your opponent throws a coin to decide whether he calls. How often you should now bluff? It does not matter. Regardless of your bluff your frequency is expected value $ 30 It is easy to see if it with the strategies in which you never where you always bluff, to calculate. Using simple logic is clear that the expected value then $ 30 for any other strategy. But although the expected value of $ 30 is established when he accidentally half of the cases calls (for Bets, smaller than the pot, it would be a different percentage), the expected value always be greater if it deviates from this Prozensatz, and we know. Callt it to 51%, you should never, he calls to 49%, we should always bluff. Nothing in between. The game theory is not completely agree. It is also concerned that the judgement of which affected whether or embeds calls. For Caller she says: "throwing a coin." Give it another $ 30 of the pot of $ 100 and good. Something similar to Setzenden she says. The advice is, 10% of all hands beds. In other words, one eighth of the hands, which missed. It is then compared with 30% of the hands beds. And doing this is to make a guaranteed expected value of $ 30, regardless of how often you gecallt. Point. Do the following if you like. The hand that I mentioned, has a value of $ 30 for you and $ 70 for your opponents, if only one of you two off. The result is otherwise only if both ignore the game strategy. This is true even for more complicated games, at least in theory. For these games is the perfect strategy spieltheoretisch but even for super computer to calculate. Now I would like to go into new waters. The above analysis seems to indicate that the actors either to the random spieltheoretisch optimal strategy or trying to keep the opposing bluff and call frequencies to identify with the correct counterstrategy to counter. In other words, your call rate should be 0%, 50% (after the game theory) or 100%. You should bluff at 0%, 10% (game theory) or 100%. This could be wrong. In fact, you should most players against a strategy that provide a random bluff and call it, but not in the game theory given frequency. How can that be, in everything I have said? More specifically, know the opposing tendencies, then you have a nonrandom counterstrategy. And you do not know, then you should read the random game strategy. What should else to say? Otherwise yet to say is that we have the idea out of the left that our game the opposing inclinations affected. And if you do not have world class players, then there is a possibility that your moves on nongame abzuwechseln random manner. Let us in our original example. Suppose that you keep the finished hand and play against someone who hardly blufft if his Draw not matter. Short term, the best counterstrategy is always to fold if he embeds. Blufft he never, reduce its expected value to $ 20 The problem, however, is your constant Folden it will encourage more likely to bluff. If you are then not adjust, its expected value of $ 100 increase. Against most players you need to slow but not in half the cases call, as the game theory recommends. A call frequency of about 30% should be sufficient. If it across the bluff, or at least its optimal frequency deter bluff, then left his expected value under $ 30, without being on the idea, often to bluff. Suppose now that you are the player with the draw and know your opponent is proud to make good Laydowns. At the beginning you could steal a lot of pot by each bed. That he will soon begin to remember and, most often to call, which would be bad. The solution is, with a greater frequency than the optimal game theory given randomly to bluff. In this example could be 25%. They continue to check more often than you embed what your opponent the necessary excuse for them to fold if you beds. If so, then your expectation value $ 45, is also much higher than the game theory by the guaranteed value of $ 30 The counterparts to these two examples may occur. If your opponent blufft too often, it probably still is not 100% call. But you should not even be 50% (after the game theory) down. If you are someone beds, like the calls, you should still occasionally bluff, that he still calls. All these strategies result in a expectation value greater than the "optimum" strategy. You can also be helpful to be in more money from players to get the question hands watch. About this issue can obviously much more to say. And it can be quite mathematical. Plot graphs, the psychological effects of a random nonoptimal settling or call strategy on the opposing Bet and call frequencies describe. It would probably not steady curve, because it is likely to be a point at which the opponent behavior changes drastically. This analysis, I will others. I just wanted you to think. *(* 
